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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
T his is an appeal taken pursuant u» KiAc .. v>; ;hc \ i.>h Kuivj> oi Appellate Procedure, 
This court has appellant ji n isdictioi i of tl lis case pi irsi laiit to I Jtah Code \ nn 
103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues air piescnlul lot review in this appeal: 
1. Did the highway patrolman have reasonable si ispicion to belie\ e that the a ppe llant 
committed a traffic offense or equipment violation to justify' the stop of his vehicle? 
:: ..• nignway patrolman exceed the scope of detention allowed for a traffic stop by 
qi lestionin" (lu- appdkinl \ ,-. • 
believe that the appellant was engaged in ennnn. 
without reasonable suspicion to 
3. Did the highway patrolman detain the appellant without reasonable suspicion after 
the traffic stop had concluded to await the arrival of a drug detection dog? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In an appeal relating to the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, the findings of 
fact are reviewed for clear error. The ruling on the motion to suppress is reviewed for 
correctness without deference to the lower court's application of the law to the facts. State 
v. Baker, 182 P.3d 935 (Ut. App. 2008). 
CONTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: " The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons of things to be seized." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 21, 2009, the appellant, Gary William Duhaime, was charged in a three 
count criminal Information. (R 1-3) That Information alleged that he had committed the 
following offenses: Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Third 
Degree Felony, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953 as amended); Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a Class B Misdemeanor, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
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(1953 as amended); and Defective Equipment, a Class C Misdemeanor, a violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604 (1953 as amended). All of these offenses were alleged to have 
occurred on January 14,2009. The appellant entered a not guilty plea. A motion to suppress 
was filed. (R 27-28) An evidentiary hearing was held on June 2, 2009, relating to that 
motion to suppress (R 30-31) Both parties submitted written briefs on the motion. (R 35-84) 
The district court denied the motion in a written decision. (R 91-124) The appellant filed a 
motion to reconsider. (R 130-132) That motion was also denied after further argument. (R 
133-137) 
On September 28, 2009 the appellant entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to 
Rule ll(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to the offense of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute. (R 182-188) In doing so, the appellant 
preserved his right to appeal the issues relating to the denial of the motion to suppress. (R 
182-188) On December 7, 2009, the appellant was sentenced. (R 219-220) The prison 
sentence was suspended and the appellant was placed on probation for twenty four months. 
(R 224-225) As a condition of probation the appellant was ordered to serve a jail sentence of 
150 days. A notice of appeal was filed on December 7. 2009. (R 221-222) On appellant's 
motion the district court issued a certificate of probable cause, continued the original bail and 
allowed the appellant to remain on release pending this appeal. (R 207-216) 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 14, 2009, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, Neil Ekberg, stopped a black 
Lincoln Town Car that was driving eastbound on Interstate 80 in Summit County, Utah. (R 
34 at p.2) Trooper Ekberg testified that he first observed the car at mile post 158 at 23:06 
hours. (R 34 at p.4) That was the same time that the video of the traffic stop (admitted as 
Exhibit 1 (here after, "Ex. 1")) commenced recording. While speaking with another trooper 
during the detention of the appellant, Ekberg can be heard saying that he had been out 
looking for drugs that night, observed the car with Texas license plates, found that it was a 
rental car and when it pulled into the number one traffic lane for no reason, he stopped the 
car. (Ex.1 at 23:39:39-23:39:50) Ekberg testified that he did not recall making that 
statement. (R 34 at p.27) Likewise, when Ekberg was explaining the equipment violation to 
the appellant, he indicated that he was aware that appellant was driving a rental car. (Ex. 1 at 
23:08:39) 
Ekberg testified that as he approached the car while driving on the Interstate, he was 
unable to read the license plate. (R 34 at p.5) He believed that the license plate light was not 
working. (R 34 at p.5) Ekberg indicated that initially the vehicle was in the number two 
(right hand) travel lane of the freeway. (R 34 at p.5) Using the timer on the video recording, 
there was about a one second difference in the distance between the two vehicles. (Ex. 1 at 
23:06:32 to 23:06:36) Ekberg testified that a two second difference at the speed that the two 
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cars were traveling meant that the cars were too close together. (R 34 at p.31) He 
determined that the vehicle was traveling at 60 to 70 miles per hour. (R 34 at p.6) This was 
below the maximum posted speed limit of 70 miles per hour. (R 34 at p.6) 
When Ekberg's vehicle came up behind the Town Car, it moved into the number one 
travel lane. (Ex. 1 23:06:27 to 23:06:45, M.S. at 9:45:01 to 9:45:26) Ekberg also changed 
lanes and pulled behind the car. (Ex. 1 at 23:06:59) Ekberg then signaled the Town Car to 
pull over. (Ex. 1 at 23:07:01) Ekberg stated that there were no other vehicles in the number 
one lane when the Town Car moved to that lane. (R 34 at p.34) Ekberg also testified that 
when he pulled behind the Town Car, it impeded his travel. (R 34 at p.35) He indicated that 
his intent in pulling behind the car was to signal it stop. (R 34 at p.34) Ekberg did signal the 
car to stop and it pulled over immediately. (R 34 at p.7) Ekberg testified that the reasons for 
the stop were the equipment violations relating to the license plate light and the left lane 
travel violation. (R 34 at p.6) 
After stopping the Town Car, Ekberg got out of his patrol car and approached the 
Town Car. (Ex. 1 at 23:07:46) He identified the appellant as the driver. (Tr. 8) Ekberg 
immediately initiated the conversation with the appellant by asking questions about the 
appellant's travel itinerary. (Ex. 1 at 23:08:00 to 23:08:30) This included questions about 
where the appellant was going, where he was coming from, where he lived and why he was 
traveling. (R 34 at p.39) He then asked why the appellant had changed lanes and told the 
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appellant that the license plate was not properly illuminated. (Ex. 1 at 23:08:30) Before 
making that statement, Ekberg indicated that he was aware that the appellant was from out of 
state and that the vehicle was a rental. (Ex. 1 at 23:08:39) When the appellant questioned 
the trooper about the license plate light, Ekberg walked to the rear of the vehicle and on 
returning stated, your "lights" are not working. (Ex. 1 at 23:08:54) 
Ekberg then returned to the passenger side window of the car and resumed 
questioning the appellant about his travel itinerary. (Ex. 1 at 23:09:02) He asked how long 
the appellant planned to be in Chicago and whether he was visiting family. (Ex. 23:09:02 to 
23:09:20) The appellant told the trooper he planned to be in Chicago a few days. (Ex. 1 at 
23:09:02) Ekberg then commented on the fact that this was a big, long road trip for just a 
few days. (Ex. 23:09:20) About three minutes into the detention Ekberg asked to see the 
rental agreement. (Ex. 1 at 23:09:24) Ekberg then questioned the appellant about why he 
rented the car, how long the trip had been planned, which family member he was going to 
visit, and the name of that person. (R 34 at p.43-44) Ekberg next inspected the documents 
that the appellant had provided and noticed that he had been handed the pre-rental inspection 
form. (Ex. 1 at 23:10:00) 
Ekberg asked who the person in the passenger seat was and the appellant indicated 
that she was his wife. (Ex. 1 at 23:10:11) Ekberg apologized for waking her. (Ex. 1 at 
23:10:16) Ekberg asked the appellant his name, requested his driver's license and asked if all 
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their luggage was in the back seat. (Ex. 1 at 23:10:30 to 23:10:37) After receiving the 
appellant's Hawaii driver's license, Ekberg asked if he was from Hawaii. (Ex. 1 at 23:10:55) 
The appellant explained that he had a house there. (Ex. 1 at 23:15:00) He also indicated 
that he owned a restaurant in Oakland. (Ex. 1 at 23:11:26) 
Ekberg then asked where the appellant had rented the car. (Ex. 1 at 23:11:26) The 
appellant stated it was rented in Oakland and upon further questioning the appellant stated 
that he would probably fly back there. The trooper asked why they drove rather than fly to 
Chicago and the appellant said they just wanted to enjoy the ride. (Ex. 1 at 23:11:49) Ekberg 
again asked if they were planning to fly home from Chicago and the appellant replied that 
they may go to Memphis then on to Birmingham to visit grandchildren. (Ex. 1 at 23:12:24) 
Ekberg asked again what made them want to drive and the appellant stated that it 
would be less expensive for them to drive. (Ex. 1 at 23:12:37) The appellant stated that they 
would either fly back home or they might drive to Memphis. (Ex. 1 at 23:12:54) Ekberg 
responded to that statement by asking if the appellant planned to fly to Memphis, to which 
the appellant replied that they really had no set plans. (Ex. 1 at 23:13:12) The appellant 
explained that he was sixty years old and pretty much retired. (Ex. 1 at 23:13:19) Ekberg 
and the appellant then discussed how much farther the appellant planned to drive that night. 
(Ex. 1 at 23:13:19) Before returning to the patrol car, Ekberg once again asked if all of the 
luggage was in the back of the car. The appellant's wife replied that there was no luggage in 
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the trunk. (Ex. ] at 23:14:11) 
Ekberg returned to his patrol car and called for an officer with a drug dog to assist 
him. (Ex. 1 at 23:14:35) Ekberg then called the dispatcher and provided the information on 
the appellant's driver's license and requested a criminal history check. (Ex. 1 at 23:15:34) 
Ekberg discussed the reason he requested a dog with his sergeant. Ekberg emphasized what 
he called "a crazy story, crazy travel plans." (Ex. 1 at 23:15:50) He stated that all the 
luggage was in the back seat, that it took the appellant about fifteen seconds to come up with 
the name of his uncle and that the cost to rent the car was $1,223. (Ex. 1 at 23:17:50 to 
23:21:26) Ekberg told the sergeant that the appellant said it was too expensive to fly to 
Chicago but he was going to fly back from Chicago to Oakland in two days. (Ex. 1 at 
23:21:31 to 23:21:39) Ekberg also said that it was suspicious that the appellant was an older 
guy with a "much, much younger wife..." and they claimed to have grandkids. (Ex. 1 at 
23:22:57) 
Ekberg then told the sergeant that he was going to see if he could get consent to search 
the car. (Ex. 1 at 23:22:10) Ekberg returned to the car and requested that the appellant 
accompany him to the rear of the vehicle. (Ex. 1 at 23:22:39) At that location, Ekberg 
explained that he was going to give the appellant a warning citation. (Ex. 1 at 23:23:06) 
Ekberg then pointed to the lights on either side of the license plate and explained, "Those 
lights are supposed to illuminate the plate." (Ex. 1 at 23:23:20) The appellant responded that 
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those were back-up lights. (Ex. 1 at 23:23:25) Ekberg replied stating, either way the plate 
was to be illuminated. (Ex. 1 at 23:23:30) Ekberg also explained that in Utah the number 
one lane is for passing only. He gave the appellant with a warning citation for those alleged 
violations. (Ex. 1 at 23:23:40) At that time, Ekberg returned the appellant's license and 
rental agreement. (R 34 at p. 58) 
Ekberg then asked the appellant if he would mind answering a few questions. (Ex. 1 
at 23:23:25) The appellant responded that he wanted to get going and there was no reason 
for the questions. (Ex. 1 at 23:23:57) Ekberg disregarded this response and asked if there 
was anything illegal in the vehicle and he specifically asked if the appellant had any drugs 
including marijuana, heroin, cocaine or methamphetamine. (Ex. 1 at 23:24:24 to 23:24:11) 
The appellant denied possessing any of those things. (Ex. 1 at 23:24:04 to 23:24:11) Ekberg 
then requested to search the car and the appellant denied that request. (Ex. 1 at 23:24:17) 
Based on that denial, Ekberg told the appellant that he was being detained until a 
canine arrived to conduct a search. (Ex. 1 at 33:24:11) Ekberg allowed the appellant and his 
wife to wait in the car after the appellant turned the keys over to the officer. (Ex. 1 at 
23:24:35 to 23:24:44) While waiting for the dog to arrive, Ekberg described the information 
he had to his sergeant. (Ex. 1 at 23:25:40 to 23:29:39) The sergeant told Ekberg that the 
appellant had a really old marijuana possession conviction. (Ex. 1 at 23:27:40) When the 
dog handler arrived, the appellant and his wife were required to exit the car and stand a 
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distance away. (Ex. 123:29:39) The dog circled the car and jumped at the trunk area. (Ex. 1 
at 23:31:33 to 23:32:24) Based on that indication the trunk was opened and 76 one-pound 
bags of marijuana were found. (R 34 at p.22) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The district court's ruling that the trooper observed a license plate violation to justify 
the stop of the appellant was clearly erroneous. The trooper's testimony lacked credibility 
and the video recording of the stop of the appellant failed to corroborate the testimony. The 
seizure of the evidence resulting from the unjustified stop violated the Fourth Amendment 
and should have been ordered to be suppressed. 
The initial questioning of the appellant exceeded the scope of detention that is allowed 
for a traffic violation. The facts that the district court found to justify the detention—the 
appellant's nervousness, four cell phones and luggage inside the vehicle—were not observed 
by the officer until after the questioning occurred. That court's ruling that these facts 
justified the detention was incorrect. The detention that was attendant to that questioning 
violated the Fourth Amendment and the evidence seized as a result of that detention should 
have been ordered to be suppressed. 
The district court's conclusion that the appellant's nervous behavior, the presence of 
four cell phones and luggage in the interior of the vehicle established reasonable suspicion to 
detain the appellant was incorrect. The detention to continue questioning the appellant about 
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his travel plans and to await the arrival and search of the vehicle by a drug detection dog 
violated the Fourth Amendment. The evidence seized as a result of those detentions should 
have been ordered to be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TROOPER EKBERG LACKED 
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP 
THE APPELLANT'S VEHICLE 
Any traffic stop of a vehicle must be based on reasonable suspicion that a traffic or 
equipment violation has occurred. State v. Applegate, 194 P. 3d 925 (Ut. 2008) In 
reviewing the propriety of a traffic stop that involves a detention beyond what is allowed for 
such an encounter, the stop must be justified at its inception and any ensuing detention must 
be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the detention. Ibid. In 
response to the appellant's motion to suppress, the state asserted two independent reasons to 
justify the stop of the vehicle. The first was that the rear license plate was not properly 
illuminated. The second was that the appellant had engaged in an illegal lane change. The 
district court judge found that the trooper had misapplied or misunderstood the lane change 
law and that action could not serve as a basis for the stop. (R. 98-99) See: State v. Frieson, 
988 P.2d 7 (Ut. App. 1999) 
The district court did make a factual finding that the appellant's rear license plate was 
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not properly illuminated. (R. 97, 99) Such a factual finding is reviewed by this court 
pursuant to a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Baker, supra. In State v. Walker, 753 
P.2d 191 (Ut. 1987) the Supreme Court of Utah adopted the definition of "clearly erroneous" 
from United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948). In that case, the 
Court stated, 
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed. 
333 U.S. at 395. In Walker, the Utah Supreme Court also noted that an appellate court 
"...may regard a finding as clearly erroneous only if the finding is without adequate 
evidentiary support..." 743 P.2d at 193. 
The finding of the district court judge that the stop of the appellant's vehicle was 
justified because the rear license plate was not illuminated was clearly erroneous. Although 
the trooper testified that the plate was not illuminated, that testimony alone fails to provide 
adequate evidentiary support for the lower court's finding. This is because there were serious 
problems with the trooper's credibility. Furthermore, the trooper's testimony is inconsistent 
with other evidence including the video recording of the stop. 
A. 
TROOPER EKBERG'S TESTIMONY 
REGARDNG THE STOP WAS NOT CREDIBLE 
12 
The evidence introduced by the state at the hearing on the motion to suppress included 
the testimony of trooper Ekberg and the video recording made from the trooper's patrol car. 
The trooper's testimony lacked credibility and should be disregarded unless it is corroborated 
by the video. The reasons that the testimony should be disregarded are that the testimony 
describing the events is inconsistent with the video recording; the trooper's descriptions of 
these events to his sergeant are not consistent with the video recording; the trooper admitted 
to not being truthful in describing the events and to speculating about the information used to 
justify the detention. His statements that are reflected on the video of the stop and detention 
of the appellant also reveal that the trooper's original motive in making the stop was to 
conduct a drug investigation. That incentive provided a motivation for the trooper to 
embellish or falsify information to justify the stop and detention. 
1. 
Trooper Ekberg's False 
Statements Under Oath 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, trooper Ekberg testified that he first 
observed the vehicle the appellant was driving at mile post 158 at 23:06 hours. (R. 34 at p. 4-
5) He testified further that he started the video recorder in his patrol car when he first 
observed the appellant's vehicle. (R. 34 at p. 27) He also testified that he did not recall 
telling other officers that prior to stopping the car he learned that it was a rental vehicle. (R. 
34 at p. 27) However, Ekberg's statements to other officers and to the appellant as reflected 
13 
on the video recording of the encounter demonstrate that he lied to the court about when he 
first observed the appellant. 
After the appellant was arrested, Ekberg described his observations of the appellant's 
vehicle to other officers. He told them that before he got behind the appellant and noticed 
that the license plate light was out, he had already run the plate number on the car and 
learned that it was a Hertz rental car. (Ex. 1 at 23:38:54) This is corroborated by his 
statement to the appellant early in the encounter. Prior to receiving any documents from the 
appellant while describing the basis for the stop to the appellant, Ekberg stated "I know 
you're from out of state and this is a rental." (Ex. 1 at 23:08:39) 
A second important incident that the trooper lied about in his testimony related to the 
lighting on the appellant's license plate. Throughout the video, the lights on the right and left 
side of the license plate were not illuminated. On direct examination, he testified that when 
the appellant was at the rear of the vehicle, the appellant thought that Ekberg was talking 
about the back-up lights. (R. 34 at p. 18) On cross examination, Ekberg testified 
specifically that he pointed to the license plate in discussing the problem with the 
illumination of the license plate. (R. 34 at p. 56) However, the video recording of that part of 
the detention clearly shows the trooper pointing to the two lights on either side of the license 
plate and referring to "these lights" being out (Ex. 1 at 23:23:13) At that point the video 
recording reflects that the appellant told the trooper that he was pointing to the back-up 
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lights. (Ex. 1 at 23:23:25) 
Another fact that the trooper lied to the court about involved his description of how he 
approached the appellant's vehicle while it was being driven on the freeway. Ekberg stated 
that he was not following the appellant too closely. (R. 34 at p. 31) He aclmowledged that a 
two second distance between cars at a speed of about sixty miles per hour would be too close. 
(R. 34 at p. 31) At the beginning of the video recording this distance can be determined by 
picking points on the white lane-dividing line that the two cars can be observed passing and 
watching the timer on the recording. Based on that method of calculation, the time distance 
between the appellant's car and the trooper's patrol car was between one and two seconds. 
(Ex. 1 at 23:06:32 to 23:06:45) 
In describing the appellant's travel itinerary as an indicator of criminal activity, 
Ekberg testified that the appellant gave three possible destinations. (R. 34 at p. 11-12) He 
testified that the appellant first said he was going to Chicago, he then said he was going to 
Memphis and he also said his destination was Birmingham. (R. 34 at p. 12) The video 
recording of the actual conversation shows that the appellant stated he was going to Chicago 
to visit his uncle. (Ex. 1 at 23:09:44 to 23:09:55) When questioned further about the travel 
plans by the trooper, the appellant indicated that he and his wife may go to Memphis then to 
Birmingham to visit their grandchildren. (Ex. 1 at 23:11:24 to 23:13:12) 
Another factor that Ekberg testified he relied upon in his determination that he had 
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reasonable suspicion to detain the appellant was that he observed four cell phones in the car, 
all of which were plugged into the lighter for recharging. (R. 34 at p. 52) On cross 
examination, Ekberg admitted that was an overstatement in that only one cell phone was 
plugged into the lighter. (R. 34 at p. 50) Although the substance of that untruth may not 
seem to be of great consequence, it does reflect Ekberg's attitude toward the proceedings and 
the seriousness of his attitude toward the oath he took to testify truthfully. 
Ekberg also placed a great deal of weight on the fact that the appellant had rented a 
car for $ 1200 and in the trooper's experience, it would have been less expensive to fly. (R. 34 
at p. 9-11) When questioned about factors that may affect the cost of an airline ticket, he 
acknowledged that when the ticket was purchased in relation to the trip would affect the price 
of the ticket. (R. 34 at p. 52) When Ekberg was asked whether first class airline tickets were 
more expensive, he responded, "I don't know [if first class airline tickets cost more] I'm not 
familiar with airline tickets." (R. 34 at p. 52) He said he did check the cost of a flight from 
Oakland to Chicago on Priceline and found that it was $250. (R. 34 at p. 52) However, he 
did not know if that was simply the lowest fare available. (R. 34 at p. 53) Nor did he factor 
in the cost of flying to Memphis and then to Birmingham. (R. 34 at p. 53) 
While waiting for a response to the request for information about the appellant's 
criminal history and driver's license, Ekberg had a discussion with his sergeant about the 
suspicious circumstances he claimed to have observed. (Ex. 1 at 23:17:50 to 23:22:03) In 
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that conversation, he told the sergeant he had asked the appellant for the name of his uncle 
that he was going to visit in Chicago and it took about fifteen seconds to come up with a 
name. (Ex. 1 at 23:18:28) The video recording reflects that when that question was asked 
the appellant immediately gave the name "Bob." (Ex. 1 at 23:09:55 to 23:10:00) Ekberg 
testified that it did not take fifteen seconds for the appellant to give a name. In doing so he 
specifically admitted that he had not been truthful in his statement to his superior officer. (R. 
34 at p. 45) 
Not all of these statements reflect directly on the basis for the stop. However, they do 
reflect the trooper's character for truthfulness. If he is willing to testify untruthfully under 
oath about what may be collateral matters, he would clearly be willing to do so about the 
equipment violation that provided the basis for the stop that was critical to having the drugs 
that he discovered and seized admitted into evidence. 
2. 
Trooper Ekberg's Motive To Lie 
In describing the reasons that he stopped and detained the appellant to other officers, 
Ekberg made a statement that disclosed his motive to fabricate both the basis for the stop and 
the justification for the detention. Ekberg told the officers that he was "out looking for 
drugs" when he ran the out-of-state plates on the vehicle the appellant was driving and found 
out that it was a rental car. (Ex. 1 at 23:38:36 to 23:39:02) 
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One of the findings that the district court made was, " From comments on the video 
there is little doubt Ekberg was intending to look for drugs even before the stop." (R. 97) 
Ekberg's desire to conduct a search for drugs clearly would explain why he would lie to his 
sergeant about the factors justifying the detention. It would further affect his attitude relating 
to the necessity to tell the truth about the basis for the stop when he testified in court. This 
motivation to lie when considered in conjunction with the trooper's inconsistent statements 
makes his statements regarding the basis for the stop of the appellant incredible. 
B. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE LICENSE PLATE 
LIGHT WAS WORKING PROPERLY 
Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6a-1604(2) (1953 as amended) requires that the rear registration 
plate of a vehicle be illuminated with a white light. The video recording reflects that as the 
trooper followed the appellant, the rear license plate was illuminated. (Ex. 1 at 23:06:32 to 
23:07:00) That same portion of the vehicle shows that there were lights located on both sides 
of the rear license plate. (Ibid) Neither of those lights was illuminated. When trooper Ekberg 
explained the violation to the appellant, Ekberg pointed to those two lights. (Ex. 1 at 
23:23:13) The appellant told the trooper that those were the back-up lights. (Ex. 1 at 
23:23:25) The trooper then acknowledged his mistake by stating, ". . . either way there's 
supposed to be a light over the plate." (Ex. 1 at 23:23:30) 
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Other portions of the video resolve the question of whether the license plate was 
working. When the trooper was directly behind the appellant's vehicle, the license plate is 
illuminated. (Ex.1 at 23:06:32) The trooper claimed that was merely a reflection of the 
headlights from his patrol car. (R. 34 at p. 37) However, Ekberg acknowledged that if the 
illumination was from his headlights, the level of illumination would change when the 
appellant changed lanes. (R. 34 at p. 37) That acknowledgement reflects both common 
sense and experience. When the appellant changed lanes and the trooper remained in the 
right hand travel lane, the level of illumination on the license plate did not change. (Ex. 1 at 
23:06:45) This indicates that the light illuminating the license plate was working properly. 
This fact is corroborated by some of the statements Ekberg made to the other officers 
who were at the scene after the arrest. He told the officers that prior to the stop he had been 
able to run the license plate on the appellant's car and receive information that it was a rental 
car. (Ex. 1 at 23:38) It is interesting that as Ekberg relayed the information to the 
dispatcher, he did not notice or describe any problem with the license plate light. Obviously, 
when Ekberg determined that this was an out-of-state rental car and he decided it would be 
the subject of a drug investigation, he attached some significance to the fact that the lights on 
either side of the license plate were not illuminated. In spite of the fact that he could read the 
plate earlier and did not stop the vehicle at that time, the trooper used that as an excuse to 
make the stop. 
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The facts and circumstances reflected on the video recording fail to establish that 
Ekberg had an objectively reasonable suspicion that the appellant's license plate was not 
properly illuminated. The trooper failed to notice the violation until after he received 
information that the car was an out-of-state rental. The video shows that the plate was 
illuminated. Finally, the video recording of the trooper's actions after the stop shows that in 
spite of the fact that the plate was illuminated, the trooper focused on the unlit back-up lights 
as the basis for the violation. 
C. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS WERE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS 
The district court's two related findings that the trooper's testimony was credible and 
established that there was an equipment violation were both clearly erroneous. In finding 
that Ekberg had not fabricated the basis for the stop the district court judge indicated that 
Ekberg failed to precisely communicate his observations, merely exaggerated his 
observations to his superiors and failed to recall specifics as he made his descriptions. (R. 98) 
In reaching this conclusion the district court ignored a consistent theme in all of these 
failures to communicate and exaggerations. The inconsistencies relating to the stop directly 
affect his claim that the appellant's license plate light was not working. Ekberg's initial 
discovery that appellant was driving a rental car, coupled with his statement made prior to the 
stop that he was looking for drugs, demonstrates that he was planning to stop the vehicle. 
20 
In assessing the veracity of the equipment violation as the basis for the stop this court 
should also consider the trooper's second asserted basis for the stop. The district court 
rejected the claimed lane change violation as a basis for the stop because it involved a 
misinterpretation of the law. (R. 98) The circumstances that led to the claim of that violation 
and the need to assert it as a basis for the stop cast doubt on the credibility of the claimed 
equipment violation. 
The trooper indicated that the appellant was traveling in the right hand lane of the 
freeway. When the officer pulled behind the appellant in that lane, the appellant changed 
lanes to the left hand lane. The trooper then pulled behind the appellant's car and signaled 
him to pull over within seconds. The trooper claimed that the appellant had impeded the 
trooper's travel and had engaged in an illegal lane change. The district court rejected this as 
a legitimate basis for the stop as it was a misinterpretation of the law. If the license plate 
light was actually not working, it does not make sense that the trooper would need to engage 
in the actions that he took to essentially manufacture the traffic violation as a basis for the 
stop. 
The statements Ekberg made to his sergeant that the district court characterized as 
"exaggerations" are also important. That is because all of the exaggerations - the hesitation 
in giving the name of the uncle and the mischaracterization of the appellant travel plans - all 
would enhance the justification for a continued detention and a request to search the vehicle. 
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When all of these factors are considered in light of the video recording it is clear that 
the findings that Ekberg was credible and truthful in claiming that he observed a license plate 
light violation are without adequate evidentiary support. Based on the entirety of the 
evidence, a definite and firm conviction exists that the findings were mistaken. 
Consequently, these findings are clearly erroneous. There was insufficient evidence to 
support the conclusion that the stop in this case is justified by the claimed license plate light 
violation. Consequently, the district court's ruling on this issue was erroneous. The 
judgment and conviction must be reversed and the case remanded to the district court with an 
order requiring the evidence seized as a result of the stop be suppressed. 
POINT II 
THE TROOPER'S ACTIONS EXCEEDED 
THE SCOPE OF THE DETENTION 
ALLOWED FOR A TRAFFIC STOP 
The second aspect in determining the reasonableness of a search following a traffic 
stop is whether the detention following the stop was reasonably related to the circumstances 
that justified the interference. State v. Applegate, supra. When a Fourth Amendment issue 
has been raised relating to the lawfulness of a detention, the state bears the burden of provmg 
the reasonableness of the officer's actions. State v. Worwood, 164 P.3d 397 (Ut. 2007). In 
State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 658 (Ut. 2002), the court described the general actions that an 
officer may take during a detention that is attendant to a traffic stop: 
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.. .during a traffic stop, and officer "may request a driver's license and 
vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation." [Citations 
omitted.] Once the purpose of the initial stop is concluded, however, the 
person must be allowed to depart. "Any further temporary detention for 
investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic 
stop" constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a 
reasonable suspicion of further illegality. [Citatons omitted.] 
63 P.3d at 660. 
This limited scope of detention is based on the legal requirement that 
. . . 'the length and scope of the detention [must be] 'strictly tied to and 
justified by the circumstances which rendered [the detention's ] initiation 
permissible.' " [emphasis in original] 
State v. Weaver, 169 P.3d 760 at 763 (quoting State v. Worwood, supra. (Utah App. 2007)). 
In State v. Baker, supra, the court described when investigative acts that are not 
related to such articulable suspicions may be pursued: 
"Investigative acts that are not reasonably related to dispelling or resolving the 
articulated grounds for the stop are permissible only if they do 'not add to the 
delay already lawfully experienced' and do 'not represent any further intrusion 
on [the detainee's] rights.' " 
182 P.3d at 938 (quoting State v. Chism, 107 P.3d 706 (Ut. App. 2005). 
Otherwise, investigative acts requiring an additional detention that go beyond those 
previously described that are allowed in a traffic stop may be initiated only when there are 
specific and articulable facts and rational inferences that give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
that a person has committed or is committing a crime. State v. Hansen, supra. In Hansen 
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those acts included the detention attendant to questioning about issues beyond those 
specifically related to a traffic stop. Other acts that have been held to constitute unlawful 
detentions include requesting a driver to exit a vehicle after the basis for the traffic stop had 
dissolved, State v. Weaver, supra, and requiring the passengers of a vehicle to wait for a dmg 
detection dog to arrive, State v. Baker, supra. 
In this case there were two distinct detentions that involved investigative actions by 
the trooper that exceeded the scope of what the Fourth Amendment allows for a traffic stop. 
The first involved the initial questioning of the appellant about his travel itinerary. The 
second related to the trooper's action in detaining the appellant to await the arrival of a drug 
detection dog and that dog's search after the appellant refused to consent to a search of the 
vehicle. 
A-
THE FACTORS RELIED UPON BY 
THE DISTRICT COURT TO JUSTIFY 
THE DETENTION FOR THE 
INITIAL QUESTIONING WERE 
OBSERVED SUBSEQUENT TO THAT 
QUESTIONING 
Before requesting the appellant's driver's license and the vehicle rental documents, 
Ekberg engaged in extensive and intrusive questioning about the appellant's travel itinerary. 
(Ex. 1 at 23:07:54 to 23:09:55) The questioning related to where the appellant was going, 
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where he was coming from, where he lived, how long he planned to stay in Chicago, who he 
would be staying with, what family members he would be staying with and that person's 
name. 
Ekberg acknowledged that his initial questions about travel plans had nothing to do 
with the reason for the stop. (M.S. at 10:26:31) He also acknowledged that they had nothing 
to do with his right to possess or operate the vehicle. (M.S. at 10:26:40) Ekberg admitted 
that these are the types of questions that may provide information used to establish 
reasonable suspicions that a person is engaged in criminal activity. (M.S. at 10:25:25 and 
10:26:54) 
The district court judge agreed with this and ruled the initial questioning by Ekberg 
about the appellant's travel itinerary exceeded the scope of a traffic stop. (R. at p. 17) The 
court further ruled that the detention that resulted from such questioning had to be justified 
by facts and circumstances which objectively created a reasonable suspicion that the 
appellant was engaged in criminal activity. The court found that the only factors that 
established a reasonable suspicion were that the officer observed four cell phones in the 
vehicle, that there was luggage in the rear seat of the vehicle and that the trooper felt that the 
appellant was extremely nervous throughout the encounter. (R. at p. 21) 
To justify a detention that exceeded the scope of a traffic stop the trooper had to have 
been acting on facts directly relating to the appellant's conduct and not just on a hunch or a 
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circumstances which describe a broad category of predominantly innocent travelers. Reid v. 
Georgia, 448 U.S. 483 (1980). The reasonable suspicion determination must be based on the 
totality of these circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). 
In relying on the factor of nervousness in this case, the court stated, "As to 
nervousness, this court believes the law is that "normal" nervousness is of limited 
significance, but extreme or uncommon or unusual nervousness is given more weight as a 
factor." (R. 115) The court then discussed the nature of the observations Ekberg claimed to 
have made: 
Again, while nervousness alone is insufficient to justify further 
detention, the nervousness Ekberg saw was not the standard factor often 
mentioned. This was described as hand shaking nervousness, stalling in 
conversation, and after three minutes of discussion defendant was still shaking, 
meaning the initial nervousness of a driver being stopped had not subsided. (R. 
116) 
The court then discussed how the issue of nervousness weighed into the reasonable suspicion 
calculation, stating "'Normal' nervousness is of limited significance, but nervousness is not a 
nullity, and extreme nervousness combined with other suspicious activity may amount to 
reasonable suspicion. State v. Chernov, 949 P.2d 1278, 1281 (Ut. App. 2000)." (R. 117) 
The problem with using this factor in determining if Ekberg had reasonable suspicion 
to engage in the initial questioning is that the initial questioning occurred prior to the time 
that Ekberg made these observations. This fact is born out in the trial court's finding that the 
nervousness persisted some three minutes into the encounter. The fact is also reflected in 
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Ekberg's description of observations that he believed to be indications of nervousness on the 
part of the appellant: 
Yes. Mr. Duhaime was very, very nervous in answering questions 
about his trip, his origination and his destination. He was very unsure of his 
answers. Every answer that he would answer, he would look up and stall as if 
he was seeking and making up the answer as he was going along. He avoided 
eye contact when answering those simple questions. His travel circumstances 
were very, veiy suspicious. (Tr. 10) 
The trooper was asked to elaborate on his observations, in doing so, he described how 
the appellant answered his questions, stating: 
Yes. He - he provided me different versions of why he was making this 
one-way trip from Oakland to Chicago. He first stated that he was going to 
visit his - a family member. I asked what family member; he had a hard time 
telling me what family member. He told me that he was visiting his uncle. I 
asked him what his uncle's name was; he blurted out "Bob" and said, "Yes, 
Bob's his name." He just acted very nervous and unsure of these simple 
questions. (Tr. 10-11) 
The timing of these observations is critical. This is because, as the trial court noted, 
observations made subsequent to the unlawful detention (i.e. the discussion of travel plans) 
cannot be used to justify that detention. (R. 116) It is clear from this testimony that the 
observations were not made prior to the questioning that constituted the unlawful detention. 
Rather, the observations were made during the course of that detention. 
That same problem of the timing of the observations exists with respect to the other 
two factors, the luggage inside the vehicle and the presence of four cell phones, that the trial 
court relied upon to justify the initial questioning. The court stated, "The other factors here 
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that the court believes justify the questions by Ekberg, combined with the nervousness, are 
the cell phones and luggage being in the rear seat of a large car." (R. 117) However, this is 
not consistent with the testimony of the trooper. He stated, "I noticed, when Mr. Duhaime 
was getting his driver's license for me, I noticed the luggage, all of their luggage in the back 
seat". (Tr. 14) The court had previously found that the trooper's request for the appellant's 
license occurred some three minutes into the detention. (R. 113) That fact is reflected on the 
video recording of the stop and detention. 
Likewise, the trooper did not mention the cell phones in his testimony until after he 
described when he observed the luggage. Based on the way that the trooper immediately 
began to question the appellant and the sequence of his testimony, the reasonable inference 
would be that the cell phones were not observed until after the trooper noticed the luggage. 
Since these observations were made after the initial unlawful detention, they cannot be used 
as reasonable suspicions that justify the detention. 
B. 
THE FACTORS OF NERVOUSNESS, THE 
PRESENCE OF FOUR CELL PHONES 
AND LUGGAGE IN THE PASSENGER 
COMPARTMENT OF A CAR FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TO DETAIN THE APPELLANT 
Even if the officer made the observations of the luggage and cell phones prior to the 
questioning, the factors relied upon by the district court are not sufficient to establish a 
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reasonable suspicion to detain the appellant for questioning. Since the lower court relied on 
these same factors in finding a basis to detain the appellant to await a canine search, the 
failure to establish a reasonable suspicion to detain the appellant for questioning would also 
preclude a detention to await the arrival of the canine and the subsequent search by the drug 
detection dog. 
1. 
Nervousness 
The trial court relied on the appellant's abnormal level of nervousness as a factor in 
finding the Ekberg had reasonable suspicion to detain the appellant. In State v. Mendoza, 
748 P.2d 181 (Ut. 1987), nervous behavior of the occupants of a vehicle was given as a basis 
for a stop. In specifying the nature of the behavior the officer stated ".. .that the defendants 
had a c white-knuckled' or ridged look and failed to make eye contact." 748 P.2d at 184. The 
State Supreme Court relied on United States v. Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1980), where 
the court held that the failure to make eye contact had no weight in determining if the officer 
had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. The factor of failing to make eye 
contact was also rejected as a basis to establish reasonable suspicion in State v. Serra, 754 
P.2d 972 (Ut. App. 1988). 
In State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Ut. App. 1988), the court addressed a stop of a person 
at the Salt Lake International Airport. One of the factors that the officers relied upon was 
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that Sery remained at the gate where he had deplaned then looked around nervously before 
entering a snack bar. The court noted that this factor and the others cited by the officers were 
very similar to the "drug courier profile" described in the literature. The court then discussed 
an empirical analysis described in that literature. In doing so the court relied on the empirical 
problems with using nervous behavior as a factor to establish reasonable suspicion: 
According to the police...50.5% of the defendants exhibited pre-contact 
nervousness. Although nearly one-half of the defendants did not conform to 
[this characteristic], the data suggest that it is one of the most significant 
characteristics to the police. Unfortunately, it is also the most subjective of the 
characteristics comprising the formal profiles. 
758 P.2d at 942 (citing: Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier 
Profile and Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas. 56 B.U.L. Rev. 843 (1985). 
The court in Sery also described another problem with relying on nervousness as a 
factor in detemiining if an officer had a reasonable suspicion to detain a traveler. The court 
stated, "The necessity for the court to make an on-the-spot evaluation of a person's 
psychological state portends enormous potential for subjective abuse." Id at 944 (fn. 12) 
The court listed a series of potential problems associated with airline travel that could cause 
nervousness. The court then added to that list "being watched, followed, or accosted by 
unknown persons for unknown reasons." Ibid. 
One of the problems related to the subjectivity of the assessment of nervousness is the 
lack of prior observations by the law enforcement officer of the person being assessed. This 
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issue was described in United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8m Cir. 1998). In that case 
nervousness of the driver was claimed to be an articulable reason to justify the detention of 
that driver who had been stopped for a traffic violation. The court found the factor of 
nervousness to have minimal significance as the officer ".. .had never met [the driver] and 
therefore had no measure by which to gauge [the driver's] behavior during the traffic stop 
with his usual demeanor." 140 F.3d at 1139 
On cross examination Ekberg acknowledged the existence of similar problems in 
forming the basis for his conclusion regarding the appellant's level of nervousness: 
Q. Okay. Now, you also said that he appeared to be somewhat nervous? 
A. Yes. Very Nervous. [Sic] 
Q. And you'd never met Mr. Duhaime before? 
A [sic] You don't know how he acted - how he would act normally? 
A. No. 
Q. You don't know how he would react to questioning or - or how he spoke 
normally? 
A. No. 
Q. So you generally don't know what his demeanor is. 
A. No. 
(Tr. 55-56) 
The district court in its ruling in this case cited State v. Chevre, 994 P.2d 1278 (Ut. 
App. 2000), to support the position that extreme nervousness may be a factor to consider in 
the reasonable suspicion determination. In that case the nervous behavior was described as 
the driver's foot virtually bouncing off the floor. That fact combined with observations of 
dry mouth and lips, unresponsive and broken speech patterns and strange and "spacey" 
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behavior led the trooper to believe that Chevre was under the influence of drugs. Based on 
those observations, field sobriety tests were requested. Chevre does not involve the type of 
assessment of nervousness as was involved in this case. There is much less subjectivity in 
determining that it is unusual to see a person's foot bouncing uncontrollable than it is to 
opine that a person is nervous because he was not making eye contact and seemed to pause or 
hesitate when answering answer questions. 
In this case, Trooper Ekberg had no basis or background with the appellant to assess 
the level of nervousness. The assessment by the trooper was not based on objectively 
reasonable criteria. Rather, it amounted to a subjective belief. That belief failed to rise 
above the level of a hunch that the appellant was extremely or abnormally nervous during the 
encounter with the officer. The factor of nervousness should not have been considered by the 
trial court in determining if there was reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in 
criminal conduct that justified a detention beyond that allowed in a traffic stop. 
2. 
The Presence of Cellular Phones 
The second factor that the lower court found contributed to the reasonable suspicion 
determination was the trooper's observations of four cellular telephones in the cair. The 
district court in finding the existence of reasonable suspicion, based in part on the presence 
of the cell phones, stated in its Memorandum Decision: 
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The parties may have several family members who have different cell 
phone numbers. The fact that there ARE innocent explanations does not mean 
to a trained officer; however, that such officer cannot reasonable articulate 
those as being suspicious. The four cell phones are certainly unusual, 
especially for two people. Whether Ekberg was right or wrong about being 
hooked up to chargers, four cell phones is not normal and standard for two 
people in a rental car. 
(R. 117-118) 
In his testimony Ekberg initially described his observations of the cell phones and 
reaction to that observation: 
A. There was [sic] four cell phones and chargers in the center console. With 
two people, I thought it was odd to have a large quantity of cell phones. 
Q. And you could see those in plain view? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Were they plugged in? 
A. It appeared that they were all plugged into the cigarette lighter. 
(Tr. 15) 
On cross examination he admitted that he made an overstatement on that fact: 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A. 
Q 
A. 
You indicated that there are four cell phones in the car; is that right? 
I observed four. 
And you said there were four chargers. 
Yes. 
And you told Ms. Natale that every one of them was plugged into the 
charger. 
I saw one into the cigarette lighter. 
So that was an overstatement on your part. 
Sure. 
Okay. 
Can I explain the cell phone? They were all connected to a charger, so I 
had no idea if they were all plugged in or not. 
So each one was connected to a charger. 
Yes. 
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(Tr. 50-51) 
On cross examination the trooper acknowledged that there was a reasonable 
explanation for two people who were driving across country to have four cell phones: 
Q. So when activity [sic] - so if you're traveling interstate, it's a good - it's a 
good idea to keep a cell phone; is that right? 
A. One, yes. 
Some people have more than one cell phone. 
Some people 
Some people have a business phone and a personal phone. 
Two, yes. 
And in this case, there were two people in the car. 
Yes. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
(Tr.51) 
Neither the court, nor the trooper articulated why having four cell phones raised 
suspicions that the appellant or the passenger was engaged in the commission of a crime. 
The trooper acknowledged that it is a good idea to have a cell phone when driving across 
county. He also acknowledged that it is not unusual for a person to have more than one cell 
phone. In this case that would mean that each person had two cell phones. Although it may 
seem to be unusual or extravagant, the presence of four cell phones in a car containing two 
people when they are driving across county simply is not suspicious and should not be 
considered as a factor to establish a reasonable suspicion. 
3. 
Luggage in the Passenger Compartment 
The trial court found that the presence of the luggage in the passenger compartment of 
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the car was a factor that weighed in favor of the finding that the trooper had an articulable 
suspicion to detain the appellant. In making that finding, the court stated: 
Of course there are innocent explanations for having the luggage in the 
rear seat. A passenger, or driver, may desire to retrieve items quickly, 
including snacks or reading material (for the passenger). [Discussion of cell 
phones omitted] The fact that there ARE innocent explanations does not 
mean to a trained officer, however, that such officer cannot reasonable 
articulate those being suspicious. [Further discussion about cell phones 
omitted] A trained officer could readily conclude, objectively, that the reason 
the luggage is in the back seat and not the trunk of a large vehicle with 
presumably a large trunk is because something else is in the trunk. 
(R. 117-118) 
The case law discussing the question of the presence of luggage as a factor in the 
reasonable suspicion analysis generally relates to whether the amount of luggage is consistent 
with the travel plans. See: United States v. WalcL 216 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2000) (Sufficient 
luggage for a weekend trip is not suspicious.) United States v. James, 44 F.3d 860 (10n Cir. 
1995) (Insufficient amount of luggage for an extended trip was suspicious.) That was not an 
issue in this case. 
The issue presented with this factor is what weight should be given to the inference 
that because the occupants of a vehicle have their luggage in the passenger compartment 
there is contraband in the trunk. Courts have found that it is not suspicious if there is no 
luggage in the passenger compartment of a vehicle. United States v. Beck, supra; United 
States v. Wisniewskl 358 F. Supp.2d 1074 (D. Ut. 2005). Just because there is luggage on 
the inside of the passenger compartment it does not mean that first, there are other things in 
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the trunk and second, those things are contraband. The presence of luggage may be entitled 
to some weight in the reasonable suspicion analysis. However, this factor does not rise to the 
level of suspicion that a conclusive factor such as the an odor of a controlled substance. 
The presence of luggage in the vehicle may be consistent with both innocent and 
suspicious behavior. It is a factor that is analogous to the odor of air fresheners or other 
legitimate materials that may be used to mask the odor of controlled substances. That is aq 
factor that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has found to be consistent with both 
innocent and suspicious behavior. In those cases that court has required the presence of 
other factors to establish reasonable suspicion. United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 
797 at 802 (10th Cir, 1997). 
The rulings from that court are indicative of the type of additional information 
necessary to establish reasonable suspicion. In Villa-Chaparro the other factors in addition to 
the odor of detergent included the fact that the defendant did not stop his vehicle promptly 
when signaled to do so; that defendant did not own the car he was driving; and the VIN 
number on the door appeared to be altered. In United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359 (10n Cir. 
1989), the officers detected an extremely strong odor of patchouli oil. That is a material that 
is commonly used to mask the smell of marijuana. The officers also had information that the 
driver was the subject of an ongoing narcotics investigation. The combination of those 
factors was found to establish reasonable suspicion to detain the occupants of a vehicle that 
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was stopped for a traffic violation. In this case the additional factors of nervousness and 
extra cellular telephone fail to raise to the level of those found corroborative in the Tenth 
Circuit case law. 
4. 
The Totality of The Circumstances 
Fail To Establish Reasonable Suspicion To 
Detain the Appellant 
The district court's determination that the trooper had sufficient facts to 
establish a reasonable suspicion to justify a detention beyond that allowed for a traffic 
violation is reviewed for correctness. State v. Baker, supra. As previously discussed, the 
trooper's intensive and intrusive questioning about the appellant's travel plans and the 
detention to await the arrival and search by a drug detection dog exceeded the limits of a 
detention for a traffic stop. The factors relied upon by the district court—nervous behavior 
by the appellant, four cell phones and luggage inside the vehicle—fail to establish reasonable 
suspicion to detain. These factors fail to demonstrate a reasonable suspicion that the 
appellant was engaged in criminal activity beyond the alleged traffic and equipment 
violations that provided the basis for the traffic stop. 
The district court's ruling on the reasonable suspicion issue is erroneous. The 
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subsequent detention violated the Fourth Amendment. The search of the vehicle resulting in 
the discovery of marijuana constituted the fruit of that unlawful detention. The evidence that 
was seized as a result of that search should have been ordered to be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the district court should be ordered to be reversed. The case should 
be remanded to the district court with orders to allow the appellant to withdraw his guilty 
plea entered pursuant to Rule 1 l(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and to require 
the district court to grant the appellant's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 7th day of July, 2010. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Defendant 
38 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
in and for SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WILLIAM DUHAIME, 
D.O.B. 12-19-48 
Height: 5'11" 
Weight: 250 lbs 
Hair: Blonde 
Eyes: Blue 
Race: Caucasian Male 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
N.T.A. 
OTN No. 19354679 
Case No. 0 ^ ^ ° ° VI 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
UHP Case No. 0709-00079 
*( , The undersigned^^^r*. lertz, /f*ideteo^ under oath states on information and belie: 
' /
 A /) that the defendant committed the crime(s) of: w 
VJ COUNT I. POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE, in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, a Third Degree Felony, as follows, to wit: 
That on or about the 14th day of January, 2009, in Summit County, State of Utah, the 
defendant, GARY WILLIAM DUHAIME, did possess with intent to distribute a 
Schedule I controlled substance, to wit: Marijuana. 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
nn^M 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 
Section 8(2)(b)(iii), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, a Third Degree Felony, as follows, 
to wit: 
That on or about the 14th day of January, 2009, in Summit County, State of Utah, 
the defendant, GARY WILLIAM DUHAIME, did knowingly and intentionally 
use or possess a Schedule I controlled substance, to wit: Marijuana, in an amount 
greater than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds. 
COUNT II. POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, in violation of Title 58, 
Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(b)(iii), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, as follows, to wit: 
That on or about the 14th day of January, 2009, in Summit County, State of Utah, 
the defendant, GARY WILLIAM DUHAIME, did knowingly and intentionally 
use or possess a Schedule IV controlled substance, to wit: Diazepam. 
COUNT III. DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT, in violation of Title 41, Chapter 6a, Section 
1604(2)(c), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, a Class C Misdemeanor, as follows, to wit: 
That on or about the 14th day of January, 2009, in Summit County, State of Utah, 
the defendant, GARY WILLIAM DUHAIME, did fail to have a tail lamp or a 
separate lamp constructed and placed to illuminate a white light on the rear 
registration plate. 
This Information is supported by a Statement of Probable Cause as follows: 
On or about January 14, 2009, Trooper Niel Ekberg of the Utah Highway Patrol stopped a 
black 2008 Lincoln Towncar traveling eastbound on 1-80 near milepost 158, in Summit County, 
State of Utah, because the rear plate was not illuminated with a license plate light. 
Trooper Ekberg made contact with the driver of the Towncar, whom he identified as the 
defendant, GARY W. DUHAIME, from a Hawaii driver's license. The defendant also produced 
a rental agreement showing that he had rented the Towncar in Oakland, California the day before. 
During Trooper Ekberg's conversation with the defendant, he observed several indicators 
consistent with drug trafficking, based on his training and experience. 
Deputy Bryan Cunningham of the Summit County Sheriffs Office and his K-9 Castor 
arrived to assist Trooper Ekberg. Castor indicated several times on the trunk area of the Towncar 
with a doble-paw scratch, indicating the presence of illegal controlled substances. 
During a subsequent search of the trunk, Trooper Ekberg located approximately seventy-
six (76) pounds of a green, leafy substance in several vacuum sealed bags. The substance 
contained in the bags NIK-tested positive for marijuana. A separate ziploc bag containing 17 V2 
Valium (Diazepam) pills was also found in the defendant's luggage. During a search incident to 
arrest, Trooper Landon Middaugh discovered $2105.00 in U.S. currency on the defendant's 
person. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
Niel Ekberg 
Landon Middaugh 
Criminalist 
[The State reserves the right to supplement its 
witness list as additional discovery warrants] 
[Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 46-5-101 (2007) I declare 
under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing 
is true and correct to the best of my belief and knowledge.] 
Authorized for presentment 
and filing this ^iStday of 
J r i n u r t m .200^ 
C<&&ity^ttorney or Deputy 
Subscribed and s 
this M 
2009 
)^ be|or,e me 
Judge 
Bail $ 
DEFENDANT'S LAST KNOWN ADDRESS: 
3788 L Honoapiilani Highway, G-104 
Lahaina, HI 96761 
TAB 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WILLIAM DUHAIME, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 91500017 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: July 31, 2009 
The above matter came before the court for decision an 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
BACKGROUND 
An information was filed on January 21, 2009, charging 
defendant with felony possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute (7 6 pounds of marijuana), misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance (diazepam), and an equipment 
violation (rear license plate light). After being bound over 
after a preliminary hearing on April 28, 2008, defendant filed a 
motion to suppress on May 5, 2009. An evidentiary hearing was 
held June 2, 2009. 
The court heard evidence and received a DVD of the traffic 
stop and took the matter under advisement, and allowed the 
parties to file further memoranda. 
Defendant filed his memo on July 8, 2009. The State 
responded July 21, 2009. Oral argument was held July 28, 2009. 
The court took the issues further under advisement after oral 
ml ,°G1 
argument. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Niel Ekberg (Ekberg) was on 
patrol in Summit County on Interstate 80 in the night time hours 
of January 14, 2009. His patrol car was equipped with a camera 
and microphone that captured most of the events. He also 
testified at the hearing. No other testimony was received. From 
those sources the court finds as follows. 
2. Some time just before 11:06 pm Ekberg saw this vehicle, a 
Lincoln Town car with Texas plates, traveling east-bound on 1-80 
in Summit County. He called it in at some point to check on the 
license for reasons unknown. Shortly thereafter, for reasons 
unknown, that vehicle again passed Ekberg. 
3. Ekberg observed that the rear license plate illuminating 
light was not working and Ekberg could not see the license plate 
clearly. The video does not clearly show either way, as the 
license is visible but it may be from the reflection of the 
headlights from Ekberg's vehicle. Defendant challenges the 
testimony but the court credits the testimony of Ekberg about the 
equipment violation. Ekberg pulled up behind the vehicle, which 
proved to be driven by defendant, in an effort to see if in fact 
the light was functioning. The camera was activated. 
4. Defendant was in lane number 2, or right hand or slow 
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lane, and he signaled properly and moved into the fast, or number 
one lane. 1-80 has two lanes for both the west and east-bound 
traffic at this point. Ekberg remained in the outside, or slow 
or number 2 lane, for a few moments then pulled into the fast 
lane behind defendant. There was no other traffic on the freeway 
at that time. Upon Ekberg pulling behind defendant, defendant 
again signaled and moved back into the right or slow lane. 
Ekberg evidently turned on his emergency equipment then and 
defendant pulled over to the side of the road. 
5. Ekberg approached from the passenger side and observed 
defendant as the driver and a woman asleep as the front 
passenger. She remained asleep a few moments, though it was cold 
and he had a flash light turned on. Ekberg made several 
observations quickly, which of course are not shown on the video. 
There was luggage in the rear seat. The vehicle had a GPS unit 
and a map was visible. Ekberg could see four (4) cell phones 
evidently connected together according to his testimony, though 
he later admitted they were not all connected to a charger. 
Ekberg saw a coffee cup and fast food papers, indicating to him 
the occupants were driving in a hurry and not desiring to stop. 
6. Ekberg asked, at 11:07, how it was going and then asked 
where defendant was going. Defendant said to Chicago. Ekberg 
asked where he had come from, and defendant said Oakland, 
California. Ekberg stated the fast lane is for passing only and 
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the rear license plate was not illuminated. Ekberg then asked 
how long defendant was going to be in Chicago and if he had 
family there. Ekberg asked, at 11:09, for the rental agreement. 
Ekberg testified he saw a Hertz tag on the GPS system, but Ekberg 
made clear later on the video that he had seen and called in this 
vehicle shortly before stopping it and knew it was a rental 
vehicle before he stopped it. Defendant handed a paper to Ekberg 
who examined it and it was not a rental agreement but an 
inspection paper concerning the vehicle. While this was going on 
Ekberg observed that defendant was uncontrollably nervous, 
shaking as he handed the papers to Ekberg. Defendant also 
avoided eye contact. Ekberg then asked when the vehicle was 
rented and how long defendant planned to keep the car. The 
rental showed it was rented in Oakland, at the airport, and was 
to be returned to the Chicago airport on January 16, 2009, and 
cost over $1200 to rent. Ekberg asked what they were going to do 
in Chicago and was told they were visiting family, and when asked 
who, defendant paused a bit (a few seconds) and stated his uncle, 
and Ekberg asked what his uncle's name was. Defendant 
immediately stated Bob. At that point Ekberg pointed out to 
defendant the paper defendant had given Ekberg was not the rental 
agreement. Ekberg asked who the female was and defendant stated 
it was his wife. Ekberg then asked, at 11:10, for defendant's 
license. Ekberg asked if this was all their luggage and the 
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female stated no, but also stated there was nothing in the trunk. 
Upon receipt of the license, Ekberg noted it was a Hawaii license 
and asked defendant if he lived in Oakland or Hawaii. Defendant 
said he had a restaurant in Oakland. Ekberg asked, at 11:14, 
other questions about travel, such as where the vehicle was 
rented, whether they going to drive back to California, and why 
they did not fly. Defendant stated they wanted to enjoy the 
drive and it was cheaper than flying. Ekberg asked if they had 
plans to stop and stay somewhere. Defendant stated they may go 
on to Memphis, and they had grandkids in Birmingham, but had no 
set plans. Defendant said he was semi-retired and was 60 years 
old. 
7. At 11:14 Ekberg went back to his patrol car, and stated 
to someone he was going to need a dog, and called evidently his 
supervisor or sergeant, Loveland, and asked if Cunningham would 
mind coming out. (The court is aware that Summit County Deputy 
Sheriff Bryan Cunningham is the handler for a trained drug 
detection dog.) Ekberg then called for a canine unit. Ekberg 
then called into dispatch and asked for checks on defendant's 
license and criminal history. 
8. Ekberg was engaged in other radio traffic with others and 
was talking about the "crazy" story of defendant, and what 
evidence Ekberg had as to his suspicions. Ekberg characterized 
the story of defendant as "very, very bizarre." Ekberg stated 
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defendant's wife was much, much younger, perhaps in her 20s or 
30s and they claimed were going to see grandkids. In fact the 
evidence later showed according to some comments on the video 
that defendant's wife was age 65. 
9. At 11:22 Ekberg stated he was coming up on 15 minutes and 
would go see if he could get consent. No result was evident from 
the dispatch concerning the license of defendant. 
10. Ekberg went to defendant and asked him to step out and 
they examined the rear license plate light. Defendant asked if 
everything was alright. Ekberg returned the documents, license 
and rental, and issued a verbal warning as to the lane change and 
license plate light. Ekberg then asked if he could ask some more 
questions. Defendant stated he wanted to get going. Ekberg at 
11:23 asked if defendant had anything illegal, and named various 
drugs and defendant stated no to each inquiry. Ekberg asked if 
he could search the vehicle and defendant stated no. Ekberg then 
stated he would detain defendant, who could wait in defendant's 
car, while a canine unit came. Ekberg asked for the car keys for 
safety. Defendant returned to his vehicle and Ekberg to his 
patrol car at 11:25. Ekberg called in to his supervisors 
evidently, and just as the dog arrived the Sargent indicated 
defendant had a very old criminal marijuana conviction (from the 
1960s) and some other old arrests, and a valid license. 
11. The certified dog and its handler arrived at 11:28, and 
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was deployed on the vehicle at 11:31. It indicated aggressively 
and strongly on the trunk area, and based on that Ekberg opened 
the trunk at 11:33. Inside the trunk the troopers found what has 
proven the be over 76 pounds of marijuana, the subject of this 
information and motion. Defendant and his wife were arrested, 
though his wife was not charged. They found $2105 cash on 
defendant. 
DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
THE STOP 
1. Ekberg was justified in stopping the vehicle as he 
observed an equipment violation. Ekberg testified the license 
plate light was not functioning and there was no other testimony 
to the contrary other than the arguments about what is and is not 
observable on the video. Again, the court cannot conclude as 
defendant suggests that the light was in fact functioning from an 
observation of the video. The court credits the testimony of 
Ekberg. This is true even if the traffic violation stop is a 
pretext for what otherwise may be a stop due to an improper 
motivation. State v. Chevre, 994 P.2d 1278 (UT App. 2000). From 
comments on the video there is little doubt Ekberg was intending 
to look for drugs even before the stop. 
2. Defendant argues Ekberg's testimony is not credible in 
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several respects. The court has examined the video carefully and 
compared it to the testimony and defendant's interpretations and 
arguments about those sources of information. The court does not 
believe the statements attributed are any thing more than either 
exaggeration to superiors or a failure to communicate precisely 
or a failure to recall specifics. The explanation for the 
inconsistencies is not, in this court's view, fabrication by 
Ekberg. For example, saying to a superior that defendant took 15 
seconds to name his uncle, when in fact a very few seconds passed 
after Ekberg asked who was being visited, followed quickly by a 
question about his name and defendant giving that name. That 
does not demonstrate Ekberg is lying, only that there are other 
factors at play concerning either Ekberg's recollection or his 
relationship with his superior. The court does not find any 
"lies'' by Ekberg, but as will be discussed, does find errors in 
conduct under what this court believes is the law of this state. 
3. The other reason given by Ekberg for the stop is not 
supported by the law. Again, the court does not find or conclude 
Ekberg is lying about the lane change situation, only that he 
misunderstood the law and misapplied it. The court certainly does 
not read UCA 41-6a-704 as allowing only passing in the fast lane, 
or lane number 1, where there are two lanes of travel. The 
"fast" lane is described in the statute as a general purpose lane 
and it may be used for travel unless it impedes someone behind in 
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that lane. Thus, Ekberg's belief that defendant impeded his, 
Ekberg's travel, is rejected by the court as a valid reason for a 
traffic stop. Driving in the left or fast lane simply, in this 
court's view, is not prohibited unless it impedes traffic. Here, 
defendant was in the slow lane, lane number 2, Ekberg came up 
behind defendant and defendant moved to the fast lane, Ekberg did 
the same, and then concluded defendant was traveling in a lane to 
be used only for passing. An officer must, as defendant argued, 
know the law and what it prohibits. If the officer validly 
believes the conduct is a violation of a traffic law and in fact 
the conduct is NOT a violation of the law, his good-faith 
personal misunderstanding and belief does not justify the stop. 
4. Still, here, the stop is valid because of the observed 
equipment violation, even though the other reason is not a valid 
basis on which to stop a motorist. 
5. Vehicle stops used to be considered in the context of 
what was often called the "pretext" doctrine. That standard is 
no longer the law and a vehicle stop is fully justified and 
lawful EVEN IF the real reason the officer stopped the vehicle 
was other than expressed by the officer. 
6. When speaking of "pretext" we normally ascribe that 
criticism to an action that has a motive which is at odds with 
the action. The "motive" is incompatible with the ordinary 
reason for the action. In a law enforcement action, the issue 
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really is: what is to be done (by the courts who review what 
officers do) when the police do the right thing for the wrong 
reasons, that is, they do a lawful act with an improper motive? 
That question has now, with "nails in the coffin," been answered. 
The answer is that the courts do nothing. 
7. The United States Supreme Court basically has taken the 
focus away from why the police act to ask what actions do the 
police engage in. If a driver is driving in violation of law, the 
police have the right to stop him, regardless of their "true 
motive." 
8. While many, many commentators have bemoaned this trend 
and the status of the law, it clearly is the law of this land. 
The "objective" approach has been many years in coming, but it is 
here and evidently here to stay at least for the foreseeable 
future. It perhaps started in the early 1970s, perhaps altered 
course before 1996, but since then has been solidified and ended 
with a recent case originating in Utah. 
9. In Whren v. United States, 511 U.S. 806 (1996) the Court 
made clear that an officer's subjective motive does not 
invalidate "objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth 
Amendment." Further, "subjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." The Fourth 
Amendment's concern with reasonableness allows actions taken, 
whatever the subjective intent. 
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10. In another context, the Court in United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), dealt with a probation search, 
where in the past the intent of the officers and agents had been 
relevant. In this case the Court again held that it had no need 
to examine the "official purpose" or actual motivation of the 
officers who made the search, to determine whether it was 
investigatory or "probationary." 
11. Ending any doubt about whether the objective standard 
applies not only in "pretext" situations but in general search 
and seizure law, the Court in 2006 decided a case from Utah, 
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006). In what 
would normally be called an "exigent circumstances" case, the 
Court quickly rejected a request for a subjective analysis, as to 
why the officers "really" entered the residence. The Court said 
"It therefore does not matter . . . whether the officers entered 
the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence against 
them or to assist the injured and prevent further violence." The 
Court also said clearly that "An action is ^reasonable' under the 
Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of 
mind, *as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify 
[the] action." 
12. While determining reasonableness of an officer's action, 
the court is to consider whether the totality of the 
circumstances justify the action under an objective standard, 
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regardless of the officer's state of mind. State v. Worwood, 
2007 UT 47. It must be determined (A) whether the ''officer's 
action [was] justified at its inception;" and (B) whether the 
"resulting detention [was] reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified" the stop. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994). 
13. A traffic stop is justified where an officer observes a 
traffic violation or equipment violation within his presence. 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 30. Examples of observed 
violations include improper lane changes, driving without 
insurance, indications the driver is driving under the influence, 
driving with a false registration, and other infractions. See 
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 26; and Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 1 30. 
14. From this line of cases, the court concludes that 
whether Ekberg secretly desired to search this vehicle for drugs, 
upon observing an objectively stated equipment violation, the 
stop was legitimate under the constitution. Ekberg's belief that 
the law was violated as to the lane change does not legitimize 
the stop for the alternate reason of a traffic violation, 
however. 
THE DETENTION. 
15. Once the stop is made, the detention must be temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
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the stop, to give a warning, citation, or receive some 
explanation by the driver. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
In a routine traffic stop, the officer may request a license and 
registration, conduct a compute check and issue a citation. Once 
those items have been produced, the motorist is entitled to 
proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by 
police for additional questioning. Any further temporary 
detention for investigative questioning after the fulfillment of 
the purpose for the initial traffic stop is justified only if the 
officer has reasonable suspicion of other serious criminal 
activity. State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (UT App 1990). 
16. Under Utah law, as stated in State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 
115, a seizure occurs if in view of all the circumstances a 
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. 
The State bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the 
officer's actions during an investigative detention. The officer 
may detain the driver to conduct a limited investigation of the 
circumstances that caused the detention. The detention, if it 
exceeds the reason for the original traffic stop detention, must 
be temporary and necessary and must be based on reasonable 
suspicion the officer can articulate. The court looks to the 
totality of the circumstances to determine if there is an 
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity and for a 
continued detention. "Investigative acts that are not reasonably 
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related to dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for 
the stop are permissible only if they do not add to the delay 
already lawfully experienced and do not represent any further 
intrusion on the [the detainee's] rights." 
17. The duration of a stop is not to be any "longer than 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. 
Weaver, 2007 UT App 292, 1 13. "Once the purpose of the initial 
stop is concluded... the person must be allowed to depart." 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, SI 31. Any further detention constitutes an 
illegal seizure, "unless an officer has probable cause or a 
reasonable suspicion of further illegality." Id. However, the 
officer must have reasonable suspicion BEFORE the detention 
becomes illegal. See Weaver, 2007 UT App 292. 
18. This case highlights that concept and the difficulties 
in reviewing the conduct of officers in the field. Under Utah 
cases, the purpose for the stop may be explored but unless there 
is reasonable suspicion to conduct other investigation which 
lengthens the detention, if the officer delays the motorist, that 
investigation is not permissible. The court examines the length 
of the delay as well as the overall reasonableness. Contrary to 
what appears to be popular knowledge, as evidenced by Ekberg's 
comments that he was "coming up n 15 minutes," courts in general 
and the Utah courts have NOT set a "time limit" of any sort. 
Reasonableness is the touchstone. Obviously a long delay is 
-14-
scrutinized more fully than a delay of 2 seconds while the 
officer bends over to pick up his dropped pen. 
19. Thus, in a traffic stop this court believes the law is 
that an officer may and must pursue that investigation which 
caused the stop initially. That involves, in a case such as 
this, an investigation into the equipment violation and even 
though mistaken in his belief as to the legitimacy of the stop 
for improper lane travel, making sure that the driver is alert, 
safe, and not impaired in some way. 
20. This case, as well as many others, highlights the 
difficulty faced by the officers in the field and by this court 
in "reviewing" or "second guessing" what officers do in the 
field. In fact and practice, that is what is involved. An 
officer's conduct is reviewed many miles and months from the 
conduct in the field. As has been said in other contexts, this 
review of what occurs in the heat of the day in "mid-battle" 
takes place in the cool shade of the evening. Nevertheless, our 
law compels such review. 
21. The unlimited and endless possibilities make it 
impossible for the court to adequately explain all possible 
scenarios as each case is so fact dependent that generalities are 
almost useless. However, the court believes that the Utah cases 
require an officer, when a traffic stop is made, to explore first 
that traffic stop. As the cases hold, the officer may ask for 
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license and registration, run a check, and then, absent other 
suspicion, send the motorist on his way. Of course the 
difficulty is determining, in the field and now on review, 
whether that officer has other reasonably objective suspicions 
that justify further and other investigation and thus further and 
delayed detention. 
22. Here, obviously, Ekberg approached the vehicle and began 
a discussion not about missing or broken lights, not about lane 
travel, but about "where have you been and where are you going." 
That discussion clearly detained defendant, three minutes in this 
instance, before Ekberg even asked for a rental agreement or 
driver's license. (Obviously Ekberg knew when he spoke that this 
vehicle was rented, as he had "run" the plate before stopping it 
and no doubt could make observations about the vehicle's interior 
that showed it was rented, a Hertz sticker on the GPS unit). 
23. Thus, contrary to the State's argument, the court 
concludes that such an investigatory questioning is, in this 
context, not permitted absent other facts yielding reasonable 
suspicion. Again, neither this court nor any court can or should 
write a "script" nor envision all possibilities. Generally, 
however, if suspicious circumstances appear to the officer upon 
an approach to a vehicle, those may be explored. 
24. The court rejects the argument of the State that the 
cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
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Circuit allow such routine questioning about travel plans upon 
approach to a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. An 
examination of those cases, and the court has read the cases 
cited by the State, reveals that the law in the federal circuit 
appears to be that AFTER asking for license and registration a 
limited conversation about travel plans is justified as part of 
the traffic stop. The cases examined do show that the officer in 
those, upon approach to the vehicle, acted in the way the Utah 
courts require officers to conduct themselves under a 
constitutional analysis. The officer in those cases asked for 
license and registration. DURING that process questions can be 
asked about travel plans, but that questioning MAY NOT 
substantially delay the temporary detention, especially where the 
delay occurs BEFORE the officer even asks for license and 
registration. That is, unless there are other factors that 
justify the questioning. The Tenth Circuit often notes in its 
cases that the questioning about travel plans did not lengthen 
the detention. See, for example, United States v. Williams, 211 
F.3d 1262 (10th Cir, 2001). 
25. The issue, here, is whether Ekberg had such other 
information that justified his questioning at the beginning of 
the stop, before he asked for registration (rental agreement) and 
license. The court rules and concludes that absent such other 
reasonable suspicion, the delay of three minutes BEFORE even 
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seeking license and registration is an unlawful detention. 
26. To state preposterous extreme examples, if an officer 
stops a vehicle for speeding and approaches the vehicle and sees 
a bloody corpse in the rear seat, obviously the officer need not 
simply ask for license and registration. The difficulty comes, 
of course, NOT when there is a bloody corpse, or smoking gun, or 
observable open packages of cocaine for example on the rear seat, 
but the difficulty comes when the officer sees what he has been 
trained to believe are "indicators" of unlawful (usually drug) 
activity that are much more benign than a bloody corpse. 
27. Here, that very case presents itself. Ekberg did not 
ask for license and registration until almost 3 minutes had 
passed. Those three minutes were consumed by Ekberg asking about 
travel plans, destination, stays, names of uncles, and so forth. 
Those questions to this court do not go directly to an 
investigation concerning the reasons for the stop, at least on 
the surface. This court does not believe, however, as defendant 
argues, that an officer MUST only inquire about what it is that 
appears suspicious, though that is certainly possible and often 
logical. The officer must purse an investigation that is designed 
to quickly confirm or dispel the suspicions. The precise nature 
of that investigation is often common and frequent, but it cannot 
be "mapped" by the courts as the facts are so divergent often. 
For example, upon approaching a vehicle and observing what 
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appears to be a blood spot on the carpeted floor, or possibly the 
handle of a gun under the seat, an officer is NOT required to ask 
"why is that blood there" or "whose gun is that." An officer may 
use misdirection, or even subterfuge, and may not want to 
escalate a situation or alert the occupants as to his 
observations until, for example, back up arrives or he has 
further confirmed or dispelled his observations and determined it 
is not a gun handle but a plastic container. Thus, the officer 
may be justified in such a situation as a typical traffic stop in 
asking about travel plans as a "stall" until some other officer 
arrives or until the officer can confirm or dispel his suspicions 
about the observations he has made. As an example in this case, 
having seen 4 cell phones, a conversation about where defendant 
was going may reveal he was a cell phone salesman, thus 
dispelling that suspicion. The conversation about travel may 
confirm or dispel the suspicion about the luggage, as it may be 
revealed defendant was a salesman with his wares in the trunk. 
Thus, there can be no hard and fast rule that an officer must 
only ask directly about what he has seen. There are valid 
reasons for asking about travel plans when the results of that 
investigative tactic may reveal whether the driver is fully 
alert, or whether he is impaired by fatigue or some substance, or 
simply to in other ways confirm or dispel the suspicion evident 
from the indicators observed. The ability or inability to carry 
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on a sensible conversation may, of course, give an officer 
substantial information about the condition of the driver or his 
right to possess the vehicle as well. The questioning in this 
case does not, on the surface, go to the suspicion observed yet 
it would still be a legitimate detention and investigation based 
on what the officer saw under certain circumstances. Again, 
absent some other indications, however, an officer, in this 
court's view based on Utah case law, may not simply engage in a 
three minute dialogue about travel plans if that is not designed 
to investigate the reasons for the traffic stop or if it is not 
based on reasonable suspicion based on other factors. 
28. Here, however, Ekberg observed factors he said were 
"indicators" and the court will discuss those further. However, 
the court rejects most of them as being the basis for any 
suspicion, even combined with other factors. The court 
understands that clearly both Utah law and United States Supreme 
Court law (for example, State v. Markland, 112 P. 3d 501 (UT 
2005); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) and previous 
case law) require the courts to examine the totality of factors 
and circumstances and to not examine in isolation the factors, to 
not divide-and-conquer by pointing to the innocuous nature of 
some factor. Nevertheless, there are often advanced 
"indicators" that in this court's view are simply not indicators 
of anything suspicious, no matter what they are combined with. 
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29. Here, the factors the court finds could concern a 
reasonable officer, and give rise to some suspicion, are that 
there were 4 cell phones immediately visible, luggage in the rear 
seat of a large car, and defendant was extremely nervous. 
30. Again, the State asks the court to include the travel 
plans as being suspicious. The court rejects those travel plan 
indicators at this point, and their claimed inconsistency, in 
this analysis because they beg the question. The question is, 
could Ekberg ASK about those plans based on what he had seen and 
what he knew upon approach to the vehicle. Again, if, for 
example, Ekberg saw what he believed was a marijuana seed, or 
smelled marijuana, he may be able to detain and ask questions, 
even though they were unrelated to that observation. There can 
be no bright line questions that the courts will "approve" but 
the investigation must be logically related to the suspicion the 
officer has and must seek to confirm or dispel the suspicion. 
31. That questioning about travel plans would be 
permissible IF it occurred during the gathering of the documents 
and during the actual investigation of the traffic violation. The 
State did not demonstrate that such questions were asked while 
the documents were being gathered such that the questioning did 
not lengthen the stop beyond the traffic stop. Clearly, from the 
DVD, the "investigation" of the equipment violation and perceived 
(but wrong) lane violation did not get under way for almost three 
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minutes. The court does not suggest there is only one rote 
memorized script law enforcement must apply. Certainly an 
officer can and should be polite, can perhaps ask "where are you 
headed" or something to "pass the time," but an officer is NOT 
free to begin a dialogue, detaining a motorist, on something 
totally unrelated to the reason for the stop unless there are 
circumstances that justify such an investigation. 
32. In this case much of the suspicion stated by Ekberg were 
BECAUSE of the answers given by defendant and Ekberg's 
misinformed and perhaps unreasonable belief in the "craziness" of 
the story. Again, for now the court is discounting those, 
however, discussing first whether those questions could be asked 
based on the objective evidence observed by Ekberg. If the 
questions could be asked, the court may consider those questions 
and answers about travel plans and any suspicion they reveal, in 
the overall equation of whether there was sufficient suspicion to 
justify further detention. If the questioning was impermissible, 
the detention was unlawful and the statements given ought not to 
be considered as a basis for Ekberg's suspicion. 
33. The "indicators" claimed by the State, and stated by 
Ekberg, include the travel plans. Discounting those, the claimed 
factors giving suspicion the fact that the car was on 1-80, there 
was luggage in the rear seat, there were 4 cell phones, a map, a 
GPS, a coffee cup, food papers about the vehicle, lack of eye 
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contact, the nervousness of defendant, and the female seemed to 
remain asleep for awhile even with an open window on a cold 
night. After the license and rental agreement were obtained, it 
could be seen by Ekberg this was a one way trip from Oakland to 
Chicago in a big, expensive vehicle ($1200 plus) compared to the 
quicker, possibly cheaper, air travel and the woman stated they 
had more luggage but it was not in the trunk. 
34. Facts that could be construed as indicators of legal 
behavior as well as illegal behavior do not carry much weight. 
See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Facts 
when considered in their totality that give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of further illegality are exemplified by several cases. 
Large amounts of money and drugs visible inside the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle justifies reasonable suspicion. See 
State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). If during 
the traffic stop, an officer smells marijuana, it creates a 
reasonable suspicion to prolong investigatory detention. See 
State v. Parkin, 2007 UT App 193 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). 
Additionally, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes and the smell of 
alcohol gives rise to reasonable suspicion. See Worwood, 2007 UT 
47. Facts that may not give rise to reasonable suspicion because 
they can be indicators of legal behavior are nervousness, are 
lack of eye contact, and a lack of cold weather gear when the 
driver is headed to cold location, especially when the driver is 
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from an area with a warm climate. See State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431. As to nervousness, the court believes the law is that 
"normal" nervousness is of limited significance, but extreme or 
uncommon or unusual nervousness is given more weight as a factor. 
Of course, this list is not complete, since there may be many, 
many other facts that are indicators of both legal and illegal 
behavior and they must be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
35. The claim of the State is that the questioning was 
justified at its inception as simply part of the traffic stop. 
That is rejected. That position being rejected, the State's claim 
must be that the observations about the vehicle and its contents 
and the occupants by themselves amounted to reasonable suspicion 
to believe there was criminal activity. Again, to the court, 
given the above law, those factors have to boil down only to the 
observation of nervousness, the luggage in the back seat of a big 
car, and the 4 cell phones. The other claimed "indicators" are 
so common to all travelers that they cannot possibly, even when 
combined with other "legitimate'' factors, be considered 
suspicious. Every major city west of Utah could be considered a 
drug source city, every major city east of Utah could be 
considered a delivery point, every freeway could be considered a 
drug corridor, every coffee drinker who needs a map is 
suspicious, and on and on. Rental cars have GPS units in today's 
world and that cannot add suspicion, even when combined with 
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other factors. Of course it is well known that drug couriers 
often do fly from the east to the west, obtain marijuana, rent a 
vehicle and return east in a rental car with the contraband. 
Still, rental cars are so common, and they have maps and GPS 
devices, such that those factors cannot amount to any suspicion. 
The possible suspicious factors are more unusual, more truly 
indicative of something out of the ordinary. The list is endless, 
but certainly includes of course the actual observation of drugs, 
odor masking agents, visible drug paraphernalia, a driver 
impaired by drug usage, large amounts of cash and other such 
factors. Of course the court must not dismiss the concept that 
officers are also trained to observe things and their experience 
must not and is not discounted and it is not discounted. 
Traveling on Interstate 80 CANNOT be suspicious in any way. What 
would be suspicious is if a person going a long distance, perhaps 
from California or Nevada to a point east, was traveling on small 
roads or through the fields and meadows and country side of a 
rural area. Attaching any significance to travel on a freeway 
is, in this court's view, simply not what the law allows. The 
presence of coffee or energy drinks is not a factor. Driving, 
even a short distance, is often perceived as boring and something 
may be needed for energy. 
36. Again, while nervousness alone is insufficient to 
justify further detention, the nervousness Ekberg saw was not the 
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standard factor often mentioned. This was described as hand 
shaking nervousness, stalling in conversation, and after three 
minutes of discussion defendant was still shaking, meaning the 
initial nervousness of a driver being stopped had not subsided. 
The court considers all factors observed by Ekberg and found by 
the court to determine if, in combination, they were objectively 
reasonable indications of criminal activity other than the 
purpose of the stop. Here, that nervousness is one factor that 
weighs moderately. "Normal" nervousness is of limited 
significance, but nervousness is not a nullity, and extreme 
nervousness combined with other suspicious activity may amount to 
reasonable suspicion. State v. Chevre, 994 P. 2d 1278, 1281 (UT 
App. 2000) 
37. The other factors here that the court believes justify 
the questions by Ekberg, combined with the nervousness, are the 
cell phones (4) and luggage being in the rear seat of a large 
car. Again, avoiding and not considering the travel plans, those 
items were necessarily readily and quickly observed by Ekberg. 
Of course there are innocent explanations for having the luggage 
in the rear seat. A passenger, or driver, may desire to retrieve 
items quickly, including snacks or reading material (for the 
passenger). The parties may have several family members who have 
different cell phone numbers. The fact that there ARE innocent 
explanations does not mean to a trained officer, however, that 
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such officer cannot reasonably articulate those as being 
suspicious. The four cell phones are certainly unusual, 
especially for two people. Whether Ekberg was right or wrong 
about being hooked up to chargers, four cell phones is not normal 
and standard for two people in a rental car. A trained officer 
could readily conclude, objectively, that the reason the luggage 
is in the back seat and not the trunk of a large vehicle with 
presumably a large trunk is because something else is in the 
trunk. 
38. This trained officer no doubt believed the items he saw 
and their configuration were indicative of someone possibly 
possessing and moving drugs, and from an objective standpoint the 
court must agree. 
39. The State urges that during the wait for the canine, 
Ekberg learned defendant had a drug conviction in the 1960s. The 
court rejects that as any basis for reasonable suspicion given 
the age of that conviction and the age of this defendant, age 60. 
A criminal history may or may not be a legitimate factor, at 
another point in time depending on circumstances, but not in this 
instance. Further, it is in this case irrelevant as there was 
reasonable suspicion without such information that justified the 
detention and this information added nothing and came only during 
the wait for the drug detection dog. 
40. Once the questioning began at the initial encounter, 
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the answers to questions may or may not provide a basis to 
conclude legally that reasonable suspicion exists. The travel 
plans and conversation may or may not "add" to the level of 
suspicion, depending on what is asked and what is answered. In 
this case it is not necessary to fully decide that, because the 
detention was already lawful based on the factors observed and 
discussed (four cell phones, luggage in the rear seat, and 
extreme nervousness). To the extent the court needs to determine 
that issue, this is a close case. Many cases involve travel 
plans that clearly are very suspicious. (I am going to visit a 
friend in Wyoming but I don't know what city he lives, for 
example.) Some are not suspicious from an objective basis. This 
case is not on either end of the spectrum. The court agrees that 
these travel explanations were somewhat suspicious, but 
objectively not as suspicious as Ekberg believed them to be, even 
given his training. Fairly considered, a semi-retired man rented 
a $1200 vehicle to drive to Chicago rather than fly. Ekberg's 
characterization of the "craziness" involving Memphis and 
Birmingham arose, the court believes, simply because Ekberg did 
not fully understand what defendant was saying. The plans are 
not in any sense, to this court, "crazy" but even with the 
presumable wealth that may or may not come with age, there is 
some "unusualness" in renting an expensive car for a short (in 
time) trip. Again, using as a basis that the trip began in 
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California cannot be suspicious, even a city such as Oakland and 
whatever connotations that elicits. Ekberg did not in fact know 
the cost to fly to Chicago, but assumed renting a car for $1200 
was more than flying. Even if it is, people drive rather than 
fly for many valid reasons, despite costs. It is not certain, 
and the court has no idea as to airfares at any given time. 
However, certainly taking 3-4 days to drive to Chicago when 3-4 
hours by air could achieve the same result causes one to wonder 
why a person would do that if the stay in Chicago was only for a 
few days. However, many people perhaps do want to take a "road 
trip'' and "see the country" on the way. Still, an officer is not 
unreasonable in believing, even without knowledge, that such a 
plan is a bit unusual. However, that does not make it 
necessarily suspicious but it certainly is a factor to examine in 
determining whether there is overall reasonable suspicion, 
combined with the other three "major" factors. The court does 
not find that the remainder of the facts revealed by the travel 
discussion unusual. As noted, the one way rental may give some 
suspicion, but defendant indicated he was not sure of his plans 
after Chicago, whether he would go to Memphis, Birmingham, or 
drive or fly back to California. Again, some suspicion may arise 
from a knowledge of that fact, but it is not of great 
significance. After obtaining the rental agreement, the woman 
stated they had more luggage but it was not in the trunk. That, 
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of course, is certainly an odd statement, leading an officer to 
wonder just where that other luggage is if not in the car or in 
the trunk. That comment certainly gives some suspicion adding to 
the equation. 
41. Thus, because the court has concluded that Ekberg had 
sufficient reasonable suspicion based on his observations 
(extreme nervousness, 4 cell phones, luggage in rear seat) to ask 
about travel plans and delay the stop, the information learned 
about those travel plans may also be considered in the totality 
of circumstances in determining whether the detention was 
justified by the suspicion the officer had. The court concludes 
it was so justified. Ekberg thus was acting lawfully when he 
asked for consent to search. 
DETENTION WHILE AWAITING CANINE UNIT. 
42. Here, no consent was given but the further detention was 
justified by the factors above described. 
43. Again, in this court's view, there is seemingly some 
belief that there is a time frame during which a motorist may be 
required to await the arrival of a canine. That is not the law. 
The test is again one of reasonableness. In a rural area, it 
will naturally take longer for a drug detention dog to arrive 
than it will in an urban setting where a vehicle is stopped 3 
blocks from the police station. Recently our court has observed 
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that in this particular realm, of waiting for a drug dog, and 
this court believes the comments apply to all such judicial 
reviews of police conduct, the courts are not to micro-manage the 
second by second conduct of a police officer. That amounts only 
to judicial second guessing. In determining if an officer acted 
reasonably in obtaining a canine to the scene, the overall 
reasonableness is examined, not the second by second conduct of 
the officer. State v. Wilkinson, 2008 Ut App 395. This court, as 
noted, believes those comments apply also to the traffic stop 
itself in that the courts cannot and do not require use of a stop 
watch by an officer nor require a particular script. 
44. Here, Ekberg acted expeditiously. When Ekberg returned 
to his patrol car, at 11:14 he asked if Cunningham could come to 
the scene. Ekberg asked for consent at 11:24. The dog arrived 
at 11:27. This stop was some 12 miles from the Summit County 
Sheriff's Office, where presumably Cunningham was. The dog was 
deployed at 11:31. After the alert, which amounted to probable 
cause to search the vehicle {United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 
1523 (10th Cir. 1993),) defendant was arrested. The court 
concludes that the conduct of Ekberg in detaining defendant for 
purposes of having the canine present was reasonable and 
expeditious, was based on reasonable suspicion, and the detention 
while awaiting the dog was reasonable and based on reasonable 
suspicion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court believes here the traffic stop, based entirely on 
the objective standard, was justified as the officer saw an 
equipment violation, whatever his true "motive" was. 
Upon approach to the vehicle, the officer is required to and 
may obtain license, registration, and run a computer check. 
Absent some other reasonable suspicion, the officer may not delay 
the stop or detention beyond what is required to complete the 
traffic stop, and the officer may not simply engage in a 
discussion for 3 minutes about travel plans, again absent some 
suspicion to do so. 
Here, the officer had such suspicion based on his 
observations upon approaching the vehicle. Those observations 
consisted of the extreme nervousness of defendant, the presence 
of luggage in the rear seat given the size of the car, and the 
presence of 4 cell phones with two people in the car. The 
officer, upon seeing those, thus had reasonable suspicion to 
justify further and delayed detention and further investigation. 
The courts cannot and do not write a script for officers, and the 
questioning undertaken to explore and confirm or dispel those 
suspicions arising from observations about a vehicle's contents 
is to be related in scope to the suspicion, but the questioning 
need not be directed solely at those suspicions as the motorist 
need not be "tipped" that the officer has such suspicions. Based 
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on the observations, and the information gathered by the 
discussion, the officer here had sufficient suspicion to justify 
detaining the motorist and the passenger. Upon asking for and 
being denied consent to search, a drug detection dog was 
reasonably summoned and alerted, yielding probable cause to 
search the vehicle. 
The motion to suppress is DENIED. 
This matter is set for a status conference for August 17, 
2009, at 8:30 a.m. to determine whether a trial will be scheduled 
or there will be some other disposition. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED th i.l! day of , 2009. 
> v 
BY THRxCOURT- /' 
BRUCE C. LUBEC#^;% "-'", 
DISTRICT COURT W^ff-'-'' 
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H I 9 6 7 6 1 
MAIL: G FRED METOS ' <j W BROADWAY STE 6l 
8 4 "I 01 ? 0 0 3 
BY HAND: 
Date : 
JOY E NATALE 
smjm. 
S.M.I LAKE CITY 
LAINA , 
TAB 4 
3RD DISTRICT CT- SILVER SUMMIT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WILLIAM DUHAIME, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
Case No: 091500017 FS 
Judge: BRUCE LUBECK 
Date: December 7, 2 00 9 
PRESENT 
Clerk: deba 
Prosecutor: NATALE, JOY E 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): METOS, G FRED 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 19, 1948 
Audio 
Tape Number: CRT 1 Tape Count: 1.4 5/2.06 
CHARGES 
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/28/2009 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST 
C/SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $500.00 
Surcharge: $247.57 
Due: $500.00 
Total Fine: $1000.00 
Total Suspended: $500.00 
Total Surcharge: $247.57 
Total Principal Due: $500.00 
Plus Interest 
Case No: 091500017 
Date: Dec 07, 2009 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 24 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by THIRD DISTRICT COURT. 
Defendant to serve 15 0 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 500.00 which includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Pay fines and fees as agreed. 
Maintain good behavior and have no violations of the law, except 
minor traffic citations. 
Abide by all standard terms and conditions of probation. 
Report any violations to the court within 48 hours. 
Notify the Court of any address and/or telephone number changes. 
As a condition of probation, deft is to serve 150 days in Summit Co 
Jail. Court signs certificate of probable cause staying excution of 
jail sentence and fine payment. 
Motion for stay is GRANTED. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 06/14/2010 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 1 
SILVER SUMMIT 
63 00 NORTH SILVER CREEK DRIVE 
PARK CITY, UT 84098 
Before Judge: BRUCE LUBECK 
Date: 7 /Ux, zaif 
BRUCE %UBECK0;->/' i 
District^ CEburfi^ tJudge 
Individuals needing special accommodations (iriSKSlng auxiliary 
communicative aids and services) should call 3rd District Court -
SILVER SU at 435-615-43 00 three days prior to the hearing. For TTY 
service call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128. The general information 
phone number is 435-615-4300. 
